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Abstract Sexist attitudes do not exist in a limbo; they are
embedded in larger belief systems associated with specific
hierarchies of values. In particular, manifestations of benevo-
lent sexism (Glick and Fiske 1996, 1997, 2001) can be per-
ceived as a social boon, not a social ill, both because they are
experienced as positive, and because they reward behaviors
that maintain social stability. One of the strongest social
institutions that create and justify specific hierarchies of values
is religion. In this paper, we examine how the values inherent
in religious beliefs (perhaps inadvertently) propagate an un-
equal status quo between men and women through endorse-
ment of ideologies linked to benevolent sexism. In a survey
with a convenience sample of train passengers in Southern
and Eastern Poland (N=180), we investigated the relationship
between Catholic religiosity and sexist attitudes. In line with
previous findings (Gaunt 2012; Glick et al. 2002a; Taşdemir
and Sakallı-Uğurlu 2010), results suggest that religiosity can
be linked to endorsement of benevolent sexism. This relation-
ship was mediated in our study by the values of conservatism
and openness to change (Schwartz 1992): religious individ-
uals appear to value the societal status quo, tradition, and
conformity, which leads them to perceive women through
the lens of traditional social roles. Adhering to the teachings
of a religion that promotes family values in general seems to
have as its byproduct an espousal of prejudicial attitudes
toward specific members of the family.
Keywords Religiosity . Ambivalent sexism . Benevolent
sexism . Values . Conservatism
Introduction
To illuminate how women’s roles are circumscribed by both
positive and negative attitudes, Glick and Fiske (1996, 1997,
2001) introduced Ambivalent Sexism Theory, according to
which perceiving women as possessing both positive (e.g.,
warm, caring) and negative (e.g., manipulative, unreliable)
characteristics simultaneously justifies and propagates in-
equalities between men and women (e.g., Cikara et al. 2009;
Connelly and Heesacker 2012; Jost and Kay 2005; Sibley
et al. 2007). These beliefs about the essential characteristics
of women, and the essential differences between men and
women, making each more or less adequate to fill particular
roles in society, appear to be relatively universal (Fortin 2005;
Harris 1991; Hofstede 1980). The ambivalence this division
entails for both men and women has been observed in a
number of countries (Glick et al. 2000, 2004).
Gender role expectations are also influenced by cultural
factors, including religion (Burn and Busso 2005 [studied in
the United States]; Gaunt 2012 [in Israel]; Glick et al. 2002a
[in Spain]; Taşdemir and Sakallı-Uğurlu 2010 [in Turkey]).
The link between religion and sexism might be direct—reli-
gious authorities might explicitly teach stereotypical views of
the genders. However, it is likely that there is also a more
indirect connection, the result of broader values incorporated
into religious teachings. A number of studies have demon-
strated how religiosity is connected to a specific hierarchy of
values, ascribing great weight to guarantees of stability and
certainty (reviewed in, e.g., Roccas 2005; Saroglou and
Cohen 2011). Such attachment to tradition and uncertainty
avoidance can affect how one responds to norm adherence and
norm violation and, more specifically, to individuals who
comply with or violate social norms.
In this paper, we demonstrate how religion can promote
benevolent sexism by way of emphasizing traditional values.
Measuring religiosity, ambivalent sexism (Glick and Fiske
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1996) and values (Schwartz et al. 2001) among Polish men
and women, we show an indirect pathway from embracing
socially favored religious teachings (Schwartz et al. 1997), to
socially undesirable prejudice, sexism. Exploring this indirect
pathway illuminates how the seemingly prosocial aspects of
religious discourse—laudatory, appreciative commentary
about women’s place in society—promote a broader belief
system that stabilizes the unequal status quo. While our work
focuses on the links between Catholic religiosity and sexism
in Poland, it is plausible that such connections are to be found
in other religions and cultures; we discuss this further below.
Uncovering these indirect, likely unconscious links can serve
as a basis for understanding implicit, deep-rooted barriers to
attitude and behavioral change.
Ambivalent Sexism Theory
Ambivalent Sexism Theory posits two forms of sexism that
differ in their subjective experience and reception but sprout
from the same roots. A lay understanding of sexism is likely to
revolve around hostile, adversarial feelings toward women—
what Glick and Fiske (1996) termed hostile sexism. Hostile
attitudes toward women are reflected in the notions that wom-
en demand special favors (“When women lose to men in a fair
competition, they typically complain about being discriminat-
ed against”) and vie for power over men (“Once a woman gets
a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight
leash”).
A mirror image of hostile sexism, that is, a supportive and
kindly view toward woman, was termed benevolent sexism.
Benevolent attitudes toward women are reflected in the no-
tions that women are morally superior to men (“Many women
have a quality of purity that few men possess”) and require
male protection (“Women should be cherished and protected
by men”). Although benevolent sexism can be experienced by
both the perceiver and the target as positive, its roots run to the
same gender ideology as hostile sexism, and its consequences
are often negative. For example, stereotyping women as more
righteous and virtuous than men imposes on them greater
responsibility for moral conduct in the sexual sphere
(Abrams et al. 2003 [studied in England]).
What might seem to be irreconcilable ambivalence toward
women (women are power-hungry and manipulative, but they
are also morally pure) in practice appears to manifest as two
unipolar attitudes directed at different types of women (Glick
et al. 1997 [United States]). Women who adhere to more
traditional roles are valued and rewarded, while women who
attempt to break out of the gender hierarchy are treated with
hostility and suspicion. Benevolent sexists believe that devia-
tions from a prescriptive set of norms should be met not with
protection but with punishment (Glick et al. 2002b [in Turkey
and Brazil]; Whatley 2005 [in the United States]; Yamawaki
et al. 2007 [in the United States]).
Religion cultivates such reward-punishment contingencies.
For example, Burris and Jackson (1999) have shown that
traditional denominations contribute to the acceptance of vio-
lence in romantic relationships. In their study, religious indi-
viduals in Canada kept the side of the victim of abuse only
when she conformed to religiously inscribed values, and not
when she contradicted them (e.g., by being a lesbian). The
victim’s behavior was considered a reasonable justification for
otherwise socially disapproved attitudes—sympathy for the
perpetrator and liberal judgments of his behavior.
The Catholic Church and Traditional Gender Roles
In its official teachings, the Catholic Church clearly propa-
gates the idea of men’s (e.g., dominance, responsibility) and
women’s (e.g., cordiality, humility) disparate traits and natu-
rally resulting distinct roles (particularly, women as mothers
who self-sacrifice and care for others; Benedict XVI 2005;
John Paul II 1988, 1995; Ratzinger and Amato 2004). By
placing emphasis on uniquely female versus male traits and
the interdependence between the genders, justifying the divi-
sion into traditional roles, Catholicism may contribute to the
popularity of favorable attitudes that are directed only towards
women who fit their “God-given” roles such as that of a
mother. Such attitudes, as has been shown in other research,
ipso facto yield negative consequences, preserving social
inequalities between the genders (e.g., Cuddy et al. 2004
[United States]). Indeed, a positive relationship between
Catholic religiosity and benevolent sexism has been found in
a random telephone sample of Spanish adults (Glick et al.
2002a).
Though differences within Christianity do exist—for ex-
ample, although some Christian denominations allow women
to be priests (e.g., Protestantism), this is not the case in
Catholicism—the ideological narratives that underlie
Catholicism could be embedded in the scripts of other
Christian denominations. Similarly, despite discrepancies be-
tween Islam, Judaism and Christianity, both Jewish tradition
and Islamic scripts concerning gender resemble those of the
Bible. Few studies have looked at evidence for ambivalent
sexism within different denominations and religions; howev-
er, the few that have showed patterns of results similar to those
found for the Catholicism. In a sample of Evangelical
Christians in the United States (Maltby et al. 2010), men’s
level of protective paternalism was positively linked to the
measure of religious orthodoxy. Similarly, in a sample of
American students who self-identified as Christians
(including Catholics, Orthodox, and various Protestant
groups, Burn and Busso 2005), benevolent sexism of both
men and women correlated positively with level of religiosity.
A study conducted in predominantly Muslim Turkey replicat-
ed findings from Christian samples, showing a positive link
between religiosity and benevolent sexism among university
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students (Taşdemir and Sakallı-Uğurlu 2010). Gaunt (2012)
found the same patterns in a large convenience sample of adult
Israeli Jews. Thus, it appears that other denominations and
religions pass on teachings if not of identical content, at least
of similar overtone (e.g., Benson and Stangroom 2009; Stover
and Hope 1984). We believe that these beliefs about and
attitudes towards men and women, and the relations between
them, are related to more global, encompassing belief con-
structs: values.
Traditional/ Religious Values as Frameworks for Attitudes
The broad pattern of values promoted by religion can deter-
mine how adherents perceive and construe issues even beyond
the teachings of a given church. The influence of religion on
phenomena that are not strictly religious has been a topic of
discussion and empirical research (e.g., Saroglou and Cohen
2011). For instance, Protestantism promotes economic values
linked to capitalism, on both an individual and a national level
(Hayward and Kemmelmeier 2011), and Christianity and
Buddhism have an impact on affective states valued by their
respective practitioners (Tsai et al. 2007 [United States]).
Values are most commonly defined in contemporary psy-
chological literature after Schwartz (1992) as “desirable goals,
varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in
people’s lives” (p. 89). The key element distinguishing spe-
cific values is the type of motivational goal they serve.
Schwartz (1992) distinguished ten value types, which can be
arranged on two dimensions: openness to change (self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism) versus conservatism (tradi-
tion, conformity, security); and self-transcendence (benevo-
lence, universalism) versus self-enhancement (power,
achievement). For example, a person who is guided by uni-
versalism will value all of humanity and seek to promote
social justice. This value might translate into low levels of
prejudice against a variety of outgroups. A person who values
security, on the other hand, might espouse positive prejudice
toward groups that are high in the social hierarchy, and neg-
ative prejudice toward groups that have low status. This way,
we propose, her specific beliefs can buttress her more general
preference for a stable social order (cf. Jost et al. 2004; Kay
et al. 2005).
Religions provide a fairly consistent way of organizing and
prioritizing values, such that religiosity has been consistently
shown to be linked to particular values in many countries
(Saroglou et al. 2004; Schwartz and Huismans 1995).
Moreover, societies attribute importance to particular values
in line with the dominant religion (Inglehart 2000). A meta-
analytical review of studies using Schwartz’s model by
Saroglou and colleagues (2004) included 21 samples from
15 countries of different religious denominations—
Christians, Jews and Muslims. Regardless of denomination,
religious individuals assigned high ranks to values related to
self-transcendence (i.e., benevolence and universalism), pres-
ervation of the social status quo (tradition, conformity), and
protection against uncertainty (security); and relatively low
ranks to values promoting hedonism and intellectual or emo-
tional openness to change (self-direction). These results can be
interpreted as indicators of religion’s pro-social foundations.
Religious individuals support the broader social good over the
individual good; the known over the unknown; social norms
over individual decision-making. These are values that allow
for the creation and maintenance of structure and order in
society. They are also values that can lead to selective intol-
erance of those who threaten or disrupt the social order (e.g.,
Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992 [in Canada]; Duck and
Hunsberger 1999 [Canada]; Rowatt et al. 2009 [United
States]).
Feather (2004) has proposed that values guide information
processing by sensitizing an individual to information relevant
to her values, which directs perceptions and behavior. Because
values have the power to influence the process of adopting
certain attitudes, people may adhere to ideologies that are
coherent with the values they endorse (Katz and Hass 1988
[United States]). Ambivalent attitudes toward women may
therefore be a reflection of specific values. Indeed, while both
hostile and benevolent sexism can be predicted by higher
endorsement of power values and lower endorsement of
self-transcendence (benevolence and universalism), only be-
nevolent sexism correlates positively with tradition and neg-
atively with self-direction (Feather 2004; Feather and McKee
2012 [Australia]).
Why is There a Link Between Religious Values and Sexism?
A direct link between religiosity and sexism has been shown
(e.g., Morgan 1987); the process by which religiosity leads to
sexism remains under-researched. A recent analysis using data
from the World Values Survey looked at the relationships
between religion and gender attitudes in general (Seguino
2011). Regression analyses showed a significant impact of
religiosity, assessed in terms of both subjective importance
and participation, on gender attitudes. Furthermore, these
effects were explained by political attitudes rooted in religious
ideology, which shaped views on issues that had specific
economic consequences, such as labor force participation or
maternity leave policies. This was true irrespective of religion.
This hints at the possibility of underlying values driving both
kinds of attitudes.
Incorporating the distinction between hostile and benevo-
lent attitudes into such analyses further illuminates the mech-
anisms through which religion might influence gender atti-
tudes. Data collected in predominantly Catholic Spain show
that higher levels of religiosity were associated with higher
levels of benevolent sexism, while being unrelated to hostile
sexism (Glick et al. 2002a). Both intrinsic and extrinsic
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religiosity (Allport and Ross 1967), as well as scriptural
literalism, correlate positively with benevolent sexism (and
are unrelated to hostile sexism; Burn and Busso 2005 [United
States]). Glick and colleagues (2002a) speculate that religios-
ity fosters ambivalent attitudes, chiefly those related to benev-
olent sexism, but the process by which this happens, and the
direction of the influence, are unclear.
One such process might link sexism to broader values
communicated by religious teachings. Specifically, drawing
on previous evidence (Feather 2004; Saroglou et al. 2004), it
might be conjectured that religiosity will be related to sexism
indirectly, via conservatism. To the extent that religious indi-
viduals attach relatively high importance to tradition and con-
formity—opting for the preservation of the status quo rather
than for social change in general—they might also be more
likely to endorse traditional beliefs ingrained in benevolent
sexism. At the same time, the pro-social values of universalism
and benevolence conveyed through religion might indirectly
contribute to a weaker endorsement of sexism. To the extent
that religious individuals attach relatively high importance to
the good of their proverbial neighbors and justice in general,
they might also be less likely to endorse sexist beliefs.
Gender Equality and Catholic Religiosity in Poland
Poland offers a relevant empirical context for investigating
mechanisms related to Catholic religiosity. The Catholic
Church is a key shaper of values and attitudes in Polish
society, on both the individual and the societal levels. As the
dominant denomination, Catholicism is inscribed in the socio-
cultural landscape and constitutes an important ingredient in
Poles’ national identity (Heinen and Portet 2009). According
to representative surveys, 93 % of Poles declare themselves to
be Catholic, of whom 67 % rate themselves as religious
(Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 2012). Almost half
(48 %) of Polish citizens claim that public social life should
be based on values proclaimed by religion (Centrum Badania
Opinii Społecznej 2007). And, indeed, it is. The influence of
the Catholic Church on the political system in Poland is strong
(Chełstowska et al. 2013). This influence springs partly from a
boomerang response to Communist rule, during which the
Church was absent from official public life. After the political
transformation in Poland, any opposition to the Church’s
postulates about public policy were taken as an indication of
support for the previous “totalitarian” regime. Thus, the
Church’s input into the writing of the Polish Constitution, as
well as later laws, has been much greater than the declarative
separation of Church and State would suggest.
Many Poles “continue to be believers first, and citizens
second” (Marsh 2009, p. 33). This influences the kinds of
gender discrimination issues that come up for public debate.
Much of the focus of feminist and women’s organizations in
Poland has been on reproductive rights, while less overt forms
of discrimination are dismissed or trivialized (Marsh 2009).
This can partially be explained by the relatively strong pres-
ence of women in the workforce. During the Communist rule,
all citizens were expected to participate actively in the labor
market. Although the fall of Communism was officially an-
nounced in Poland in 1989, some effects of its policies endure:
women still expect and are expected to work outside the
home. The decades of women’s labor participation mean that
both men and women are accustomed to idea of women
playing both professional and domestic roles. Currently,
Poland ranks 54th worldwide in terms of women in parlia-
ment, with 24 % of the lower house and 13 % of the Senate
(Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). The gender inequality in-
dex is 0.14, giving Poland a rank of 24th worldwide (United
Nations Development Programme 2013). These (relatively)
positive rankings belie gender attitudes that are still quite
traditional on the homefront, even among young adults.
While in national surveys 46 % of couples declare a prefer-
ence for a partnership model of marriage, women are still
vastly more likely to have full responsibility for household
chores such as laundry, meal preparation, and cleaning
(Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 2013b). Research with
student samples in Poland has indicated stronger hostile- and
benevolent-sexist attitudes than those found among samples
in South Africa and the United Kingdom (Zawisza et al. 2013)
and in the United States (Forbes et al. 2004).
Overview of the Present Study
Because religion has the power to establish value hierarchies,
and the acceptance of distinct gender roles can be linked to
religiosity (Burn and Busso 2005), Catholicism and the level
of religiosity of its followers may contribute to the popularity
of specific forms of sexism in predominantly Catholic
countries. A study was designed to investigate these
relationships showing that Catholic church attendance can
be linked to benevolent sexist attitudes through traditional
values, taking into account the effects of gender and
education.
In the study, we tested hypotheses linking Catholic religi-
osity, benevolently sexist attitudes, and personal values.
Based on previous work by Saroglou and colleagues
(2004), Glick and colleagues (2002a, b), as well as Schwartz
and Huismans (1995), we made the following two predictions,
one concerning a direct effect, the other concerning an indirect
effect:
Hypothesis 1: Greater Catholic religiosity will be associated
with higher benevolent sexism among both
women and men.
Hypothesis 2: The link between Catholic religiosity and be-
nevolent sexism will be mediated by values
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among both women and men. Specifically,
we predict:
Hypothesis 2a: a positive indirect effect via values of
Conservatism;
Hypothesis 2b: a negative indirect effect via values of Self-
transcendence.
To test these hypotheses, we used regression analysis
(Hypothesis 1) and mediation analysis (Hypothesis 2).
Being aware of the potential interplay of religiosity, sexism
and values with participant’s age and education, we included
these socio-demographic variables as covariates in all analy-
ses. Previous studies have shown that even within a relatively
homogenous cultural and religious context, sexist attitudes are
likely to vary with education and age (Gaunt 2012; Glick et al.
2002a). Similarly, people tend to value security more and
hedonism less with age; the more educated they are, the more
they value self-direction and the less tradition (Schwartz
1992). Moreover, education has been shown to interact with
gender: among students, gender differences in values were
weaker than in non-student samples of comparable age
(Schwartz and Rubel 2005). However, having no theoretical
or empirical support for hypotheses concerning these vari-
ables, we made no specific predictions concerning the influ-
ence of demographic characteristics on the studied relation-
ships per se. For the same reason, investigations into links




Completed questionnaires were gathered from 189 respon-
dents. Participants were recruited from among passengers
of long-distance trains running on two routes in the
Southern (Warsaw-Cracow) and Eastern (Warsaw-Lublin)
parts of Poland. The analyzed sample consisted of 180
participants: 159 respondents who declared themselves as
Catholics, and 21 respondents who indicated no religious
affiliation. To reduce ambiguity in interpreting our religi-
osity variable, we excluded six respondents who declared
religious denominations other than Catholicism (1
Orthodox, 3 Protestant, 1 Judaic, and 1 Buddhist) and three
who did not respond to the question. Our final sample was
less religious than a representative sample of Poles would
be: it consisted of 12 % non-believers, 22 % non-
practitioners, 41 % irregular practitioners and 25 % regular
practitioners. The representative percentages would be 5 %,
7 %, 37 %, and 51 %, respectively (Centrum Badania
Opinii Społecznej 2013a).
The sample consisted of 104 women and 76 men. The
mean age of participants (18–77, M=33.49, SD=13.76) was
close to the median age of a statistical Pole (Mdn=38.4), but
our sample was better educated than a representative sample
of Poles of a similar age would be: 51 % of our participants
had a higher education, 16 % incomplete higher, 9 % postsec-
ondary, and 23 % had completed secondary or lower educa-
tion. A representative sample would have 33 %, n/a, 3 %, and
64 %, respectively (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2013).
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics by gender in
the final sample. No gender differences were found for edu-
cation, age or religiosity.
Participants were approached in their compartments during
an approximately 3-h train ride by a female undergraduate
research assistant who introduced the study as an attitude
survey. All responses were anonymous. It took participants
approximately 15 min to complete the survey.
Measures
Ambivalent Sexism
We used a back-translated Polish version of the Ambivalent
Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick and Fiske 1996). Following
Glick et al.’s (2000) suggestion, we used non-reversed word-
ing of all items. The ASI consists of 22 statements (see
Appendix for English items and their Polish wording), half
of them comprising the hostile subscale (α=.89, M=2.63,
SD=1.06 in our sample) and half the benevolent subscale
(α= .81, M=2.97, SD=0.98). Participants rated each
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of the participants
Women (n=104) Men (n=76)
n % n %
Education
Secondary or lower 27 26.0 15 20.0
Postsecondary 8 7.7 8 10.7
Incomplete higher 14 13.5 15 20.0
Higher 55 52.9 37 49.3
Religiosity
Non-believers 8 7.8 13 17.3
Non-practitioners 20 19.6 19 25.3
Irregular practitioners 47 46.1 26 34.7





Note. There were no significant differences between men and women in
the reported variables
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statement on a six-point Likert-type scale, from 0 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Values
We used an abbreviated version of the Schwartz et al.’s (2001)
Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ). In the PVQ, 21 descrip-
tions of people matching the respondent’s gender are present-
ed (e.g., “It’s very important to [him/her] to help the people
around [him/her]. [He/She] wants to care for other people”)
and the respondent’s task is to assess his or her subjective
similarity with each. The greater the similarity (indicated on a
six-point Likert-type scale from 1 to 6), the more important the
value that they represent to the respondent.
Following Schwartz (2003), we centered each person’s
responses on his or her own mean in order to eliminate
individual differences in use of the response scale.
Cronbach’s alphas for the particular scales were: .67 for con-
servatism (M=−0.16, SD=0.78), .73 for openness to change
(M=−0.06, SD=0.76), .72 for self-enhancement (M=−0.44,
SD=0.82), and .65 for self-transcendence (M=0.64, SD=
0.66). Because the values were highly correlated, we per-
formed a Principal Components Analysis (with the varimax
rotation), which revealed two factors (eigenvalues >1) that
corresponded with Schwartz’s distinction of two bipolar di-
mensions: conservatism vs. openness to change; and self-
transcendence vs. self-enhancement. For the sake of simplic-
ity, these two dimensions are hereafter called Conservatism
and Self-transcendence. Composite value measures were
computed by subtracting the opposing value scores, such that
higher scores indicate greater Conservatism (M=0.01, SD=
1.46) and greater Self-transcendence (M=1.09, SD=1.38).
Religiosity
Religiosity was assessed with three items. The first asked
whether the participant was Catholic (yes/no). If respondents
were not Catholic, they were asked to indicate their religion, if
any (open-ended). This allowed us to eliminate individuals of
other faiths. The third question was a one-item ordinal mea-
sure of the frequency of church attendance (regular/ irregular/
none). Because approximately 95 % of Poles come from a
Catholic background (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej
2009), the relevant distinction in this context is not between
different denominations but the strength of association with
Catholicism. Therefore, following Glick et al. (2002a), we
assessed Catholic religiosity by collapsing responses to the
questions about religious denomination with frequency of
church attendance. Based on these questions, we composed
an ordinal measure with four categories of (Catholic) religi-
osity: nonbelievers (Catholic: no, other denomination: no,
church attendance: none), non-practitioners (Catholic: yes,
church attendance: none), irregular practitioners (Catholic:
yes, church attendance: irregular), and regular practitioners
(Catholic: yes, church attendance: regular).
As Tarakeshwar et al. (2003) noted in their meta-analysis,
frequency of attendance is a global indicator typically used in
studies dealing with religion. In previous research, this mea-
sure proved to be satisfactory when predicting gender division
of labor (Sanchez and Hall 1999) and benevolent sexism
(Glick et al. 2002a).
Demographics
Participants answered questions concerning their gender, age,
and educational level. Categories used are shown in Table 1.
Results
Gender Differences in Values and Sexism
Gender differences in sexism and values were computed in a
MANCOVA controlling for participants’ age and educational
level (see Table 2). Men scored higher than women both on
hostile, F(1,176)=24.63, p<.001 and benevolent sexism,
F(1,176)=6.51, p<.05, and these effects were stronger for
hostile attitudes (partial η2=.13) than for benevolent attitudes
(η2=.04). We found no significant gender differences in mean
scores for value dimensions.
Religiosity and Sexism
Correlations between all continuous study variables were
computed separately for women and men (see Table 3).
Following Glick and Fiske (1996), partial correlations were
used to test the link between religiosity and benevolence while
controlling for hostility and vice versa.
Direct Effects
To test the effect of Catholic religiosity on sexism (Hypothesis
1), we performed regression analyses separately for men and
women (see Table 4). To control for the positive correla-
tions between hostile and benevolent sexism, the comple-
mentary form of sexism was entered in the first step as a
control variable, together with age and education.
Catholic religiosity was then entered in the second step
to assess its unique effect on sexism above and beyond
demographic variables. All variables were assessed for
possible multicollinearity using tolerance and the variance
inflation factor (VIF). Tolerance values of .829 to .996
and VIF values of 1.003 to 1.206 indicated that
multicollinearity was not an issue in either of the equa-
tions. Although all models reached significance, religios-
ity was a significant predictor of benevolent sexism only
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among women, β=.20, p< .05, not men, β=.09, ns. Thus,
Hypothesis 1 was only partially supported.
For both genders, religiosity was unrelated to hostile sex-
ism (β=.05, ns, and β=.06, ns). Moreover, age was not a
significant predictor of sexism in either of the equations.
Higher educational attainment predicted lower hostile sexism
(β=−.24, p <. 05) among men, but not women (β=−.07, ns)
and was unrelated to benevolent sexism.
Indirect Effects Through Values
In order to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, concerning indirect
effects of Catholic religiosity on benevolent sexism via the
values of Conservatism and Self-transcendence, we conducted
mediation analyses controlling for hostile sexism, age and
education (the pattern of results did not change when these
variables were not controlled for).
We followed the procedure described by Preacher and
Hayes (2008) to test for indirect and direct effects in a multiple
mediator model. We used the PROCESS macro (Model 4,
Hayes 2013) and requested 10,000 bootstrap samples.
Among women (see Fig. 1), the indirect effect of religiosity
on benevolent sexism via values was positive and significant for
Conservatism, B=.05, SE=.04. The indirect effect had a boot-
strap 95% bias corrected confidence interval of .005 to .135. For
Self-transcendence, the corresponding interval was −.071 to
.010, indicating that the effect was non-significant. Similarly,
among men (see Fig. 2) the indirect effect of religiosity on
benevolent sexism via Conservatism was positive and signifi-
cant, B=.10, SE=.04, 95%CI [.024, .207] and was insignificant
via Self-transcendence, 95%CI [−.037, .021]. Thus, Hypothesis
2a was supported and Hypothesis 2b was rejected in both
genders.
To address possible alternative causality, we checked the
significance of the indirect effects in a reversed mediation
model, with value dimensions as independent variables and
Catholic religiosity as a mediator. We used the MEDIATE
macro (Hayes 2013) and requested 10,000 bootstrap samples
(Hayes and Preacher 2013). For both women and men, we
obtained non-significant indirect effects for each of the values.
Similarly, in models with hostile sexism as a dependent var-
iable, none of the indirect effects reached significance.
Table 3 Correlations between ASI, values and religiosity
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Hostile sexism – .58** .01 −.19† .08 −.08 −.09
2. Benevolent sexism .32** – .18† .04 .27** .01 −.19†
3. Conservatism .09 .23† – .48** .24* .54*** −.10
4. Self-transcendence −.03 .04 .19 – .07 .49*** .01
5. Religiosity .05 .10 .43*** .05 – −.03 −.24*
6. Age .05 −.01 .25* .29* .04 – .07
7. Education −.26* .00 −.01 −.10 .03 −.02 –
Note. Intercorrelations among men (n=76) are presented below the diagonal, and intercorrelations among women (n=104) are presented above the
diagonal. Higher values on all measures indicate higher construct level. For correlations with benevolent sexism and hostile sexism, partial coefficients
controlling for positive link between the two constructs are shown
† p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.05
Table 2 Means and standard deviations for all continuous variables by participant gender
Women Men Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA)
Variables M SD M SD F (1,176) Partial η2
Hostile sexism 2.30a 1.00 3.06b .98 24.63*** .13
Benevolent sexism 2.81a 1.00 3.15b .90 6.51* .04
Conservatism −.12 .84 −.25 .65 .55 .00
Openness to change −.12 .83 .07 .59 2.14 .01
Self-transcendence .68 .71 .55 .56 .63 .00
Self-enhancement −.49 .86 −.38 .76 .38 .00
Note. Scale endpoints for the two sexism subscales were 0 and 5. For each person, value scores on a 1–6 scale were centered around his/her mean, thus
the score could range from −5 to 5. Differences between male and female participants were tested with a MANCOVA (controlling for participant’s age
and educational level), which revealed a significant main effect of gender, Wilks λ=.85, F (6, 167)=4.97, p<.001, partial η2 =.15. Means that are
significantly different between men and women are denoted with different subscripts within rows
*p<.05, ***p<.001
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Discussion
In this study, we examined whether religiosity could contrib-
ute both directly and indirectly to the popularity of ambivalent
sexism. Results partially confirmed previous findings (Burn
and Busso 2005; Gaunt 2012; Glick et al. 2002a; Maltby et al.
2010; Taşdemir and Sakallı-Uğurlu 2010): among women
(but not men) religiosity proved to reinforce benevolent sex-
ism, and was unrelated to hostile sexism.
Extending previous findings, we showed that among both
genders the relationship between religiosity and benevolent
sexism was mediated by attachment to Conservatism, values
that can be likened to traditional world-views—respect for
tradition, submission to societal norms, support for the status
quo, and intellectual and emotional interdependence.
These results support the argument (e.g., Glick et al. 2002a)
that benevolent sexism, as long as it is considered a positive
attitude, is propagated by legitimate social institutions, such as
the Catholic Church. We extend previous findings by explor-
ing the mechanisms underlying this connection. Religiosity
shapes sexist attitudes not only directly, but also indirectly, by
referring to traditional norms and values and through the
conventionalism of gender roles it advocates. It seems that
church attendance, linked positively to valuing conformity,
tradition, and security over openness to change, leads
Catholics to an appreciation of women in their unique role
as delicate, moral caretaker. Even if their proclaimed content
takes only the benevolent form, these ideologies sustain gen-
der inequalities on a societal level.
Our hypotheses were not fully supported, however, nor do
our results fully replicate previous findings. Religion was not
directly linked to benevolent sexism among men in our sample.
This is inconsistent with previous research using similar mea-
sures of religiosity (Gaunt 2012; Glick et al. 2002a). It is
plausible that the gender differences in links between different
forms of religiosity and subcomponents of benevolent sex-
ism—particularly protective paternalism—previously noted in
American samples (Maltby et al. 2010; McFarland 1989), are
reflected here. Because, to some extent, men and women might
construe religious behavior and beliefs differently, our measure
of religiosity might not have been sufficient to uncover existing
associations. This issue deserves attention in future research.
The lack of significant direct and indirect links between
religiosity and hostile sexism, meanwhile, is consistent with
previous research and with our argumentation that religions
explicitly eschew derogation of women. Also in line with
previous findings (e.g., Glick et al. 2000; Mikołajczak and
Pietrzak 2013), men as compared to women in our sample
showed greater support both for hostile and benevolent sexist












Fig. 1 Mediation effects of religiosity on benevolent sexism through
endorsed values among women. Note: †p<.10, *p<.05. Entries are
unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthe-












Fig. 2 Mediation effects of religiosity on benevolent sexism through
endorsed values among men. Note: †p<.10, *p<.05, ***p<.001. Entries
are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in paren-
theses. The dotted line indicates the path for simple regression (not
controlling for mediators)
Table 4 Regression equations predicting sexism from religiosity and
socio-demographic variables
Women Men
HS BS HS BS
Step 1 (BS/HS)a .54*** .53*** .35** .38**
Age −.06 .01 .04 −.01
Education −.08 −.16† −.24* .00
R2 .33*** .34*** .20*** .14*
F 15.74*** 16.87*** 5.84*** 3.83*
df 3, 100 3, 73
Step 2 (BS/HS)a .52 .48*** .34** .37**
Age −.06 .01 .04 −.01
Education −.07 −.12 −.24* −.01
Religiosity .05 .20* .06 .10
ΔR2 .01 .04* .01 .01
F 11.82*** 14.65*** 4.41** 3.05*
df 4, 100 4, 73
Note. Standardized beta coefficients are reported
HS hostile sexism, BS benevolent sexism
aHS was entered as a control variable to the regression equations of BS,
BS was entered as a control variable to the regression equations of HS
† p<.10 *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001
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Previous research has shown that in terms of values, women
attribute more importance to self-transcendence (benevolence
and universalism), whilemen espousemore openness to change
and self-enhancement (Schwartz and Rubel 2005). Although,
we found no differences between the genders in relative impor-
tance given to value dimensions, it is plausible that this is due to
our fairly small sample size: the conclusion from Schwartz and
Rubel’s (2005) metaanalysis is that effects are usually small in
size, and so might be revealed only in larger samples.
Contrary to previous research (Saroglou et al. 2004;
Schwartz and Huismans 1995), we found no direct link be-
tween religion and values relating to self-transcendence.
Similarly, no indirect link between religiosity and sexism
leading through these values was observed. This again could
be due to the way in which we assessed religiosity in our
study, looking at declared belief and practice, rather than more
nuanced, subjective measures of religion. It could be that
religious practice itself is a form of religiosity that is connected
to ritual, adherence to tradition, repetition of actions—aspects
we might expect to be associated with Conservatism.
Meanwhile, measures focused on deeper meaning, a moral
and spiritual compass, might tap more into aspects of religi-
osity that would more naturally cohere with Self-
transcendence. Thus, more sophisticated measures of religios-
ity (e.g., Allport and Ross 1967; Batson et al. 1978) might
serve to reconcile these findings with previous research.
Several other points of interest emerged from this study
with respect to the links between ambivalent sexism and age
and education, which have been equivocal so far. Results from
two large community samples, one in Spain (BS positively
correlated with age, negatively correlated with education;
Glick et al. 2002a) and one in Israel (BS uncorrelated with
age, negatively correlated with education only among men;
Gaunt 2012), were inconsistent; nor were they compatible with
results found in our prior research with a Polish sample (BS
negatively correlated with age only among women, negatively
correlated with education: Mikołajczak and Pietrzak 2013).
In the present study, age was unrelated to sexism in both
genders, which corroborates results obtained by Glick and
colleagues (2002a) in the case of hostile sexism, and results
obtained by Gaunt (2012) and Mikołajczak and Pietrzak
(2013) for benevolent sexism among men. Future studies
could investigate the source of discrepancies in this variable.
In both genders, age predicted greater importance attributed to
conservatism over openness to change, and to self-
transcendence over self-enhancement, which is in line with
previous findings (Schwartz 1992).
As in the Spanish study (Glick et al. 2002a), education in
our sample was negatively related to hostile sexism among
men and negatively related to benevolent sexism among
women (however, this relationship became insignificant when
controlling for religiosity). As with age, future studies could
resolve the inconsistencies observed in various samples.
Limitations
An obvious limitation to these studies is their correlational
nature, due to which definitive causal inferences about the
relationship between religiosity, values, and sexism cannot be
made. Based on previous findings (Hayward and Kemmelmeier
2011; Paloutzian et al. 1999) we can speculate that the direc-
tionality is likely to lead from religious engagement through
values to attitudes. However, an alternative explanation, assum-
ing that both religiosity and sexism could be perceived as
manifestations of broader traditional values (cf. Inglehart and
Baker 2000), might also be considered in future studies.
Although mediational models that we tested with other di-
rectionalities were not significant, experimental studies are need-
ed to support these preliminary ideas. We conjecture that prim-
ing religiosity among believers would activate specific values
that in turn would lead to greater support for benevolent sexism.
Furthermore, we imagine that directly activating specific
(conservative) values could itself lead to more sexist responses.
Additionally, a more refined view of values, as recently
proposed by Schwartz and colleagues (2012), would allow
for more specific predictions about links to attitudes. The most
relevant elaboration from the point of view of these studies is
the distinction between personal and societal security. While
the former is a value focused on the self—personal belonging,
cleanliness, avoidance of indebtedness—the latter is focused on
the stability and predictability of the social system in which we
function. This value is closely associated with abiding to social
norms and conventions, the “rules” component of the confor-
mity value. Disambiguating these two aspects of security might
lead to new connections between these values and benevolent
sexism. The finer distinction within the tradition value, sepa-
rating a ‘humility’ component from a purer ‘tradition’ compo-
nent, might also influence these relationships. Similarly for
values of self-transcendence, a new distinction into ‘depend-
ability’ and ‘caring’ components within benevolence values,
and into ‘concern’ for all humanity and ‘tolerance’ components
within universalism values (Schwartz et al. 2012) could shed
more light on the link between religiosity and sexism.
Our study was also potentially limited by our lack of contex-
tualization of religiosity. Religion is primarily transmitted
intergenerationally through the family (e.g., Bengtson et al.
2009; Myers 2004). Including questions regarding family histo-
ry with religion would allow for a fuller analysis of the interplay
of values, attitudes, and religious belief. This is particularly
relevant because of the observed intergenerational transmission
of benevolent sexism (Montañés et al. 2012). Additionally, the
influence of the specific national context should be examined.
The proportion of the population that is religious, as well as the
quality of the relationship between church and state, could
influence how values translate to attitudes (Roccas 2005;
Roccas and Schwartz 1997). It is plausible that in more religious
nations, where the church has more political power, the values
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promoted by religious institutions would more strongly shape
attitudes than in countries where such influence is more margin-
al (Roccas 2005; Schwartz 2013).
Future studies would also benefit from the inclusion of
more conceptually sophisticated measures of religiosity (see,
e.g., Hill 2005; Saroglou 2011). For example, it is possible
that among men benevolent sexism correlates with measures
more akin to intrinsic religiosity. Moreover, to the extent that
intrinsically religious individuals perceive themselves as car-
ing and compassionate toward others (self-transcendence),
rather than striving for power or achievement (self-
enhancement), they might be also less hostile sexist.
Religious fundamentalism, on the other hand, might be linked
withmore support for hostile sexist attitudes. Thus, despite the
predictive power of church attendance (Glick et al. 2002a;
Sanchez and Hall 1999; Tarakeshwar et al. 2003), more nu-
anced indicators of religiosity, such as well-validated scales of
intrinsic, extrinsic, quest religiosity (e.g., Batson et al. 1978),
as well as fundamentalism (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger
1992), would surely illuminate the ways in which religion,
values, and sexism are linked.
The distribution of religiosity in our sample (see Table 1)
was slightly different from what is typically obtained in rep-
resentative samples in Poland (e.g., Centrum Badania Opinii
Społecznej 2013a) with an overrepresentation of non-
believers to the detriment of regular practitioners. For the
purposes of our study, this was fortuitous—it allowed us test
our hypotheses using a broader scale of experience than would
be likely with a more representative (religiously homogenous)
sample. On the other hand, the relationships observed in this
sample might not generalize to samples with fewer non-
believers. This sampling bias is likely amplified by the rela-
tively higher education level of our sample, relative to the
norm for Poland. It is likely that passengers of long-distance
trains include a greater proportion of members of the middle-
class or upper-middle classes than would be found in, for
example, local commuter trains. Our sample is more typical
of Polish society than a student sample would be, but is,
nonetheless, not fully representative.
For the aforementioned reasons, the implications of the
study results should be treated with due caution. We hope that
future research will take some of these limitations into con-
sideration and build on the results presented here.
Conclusion
Our assumption that the link between Catholic religiosity and
benevolent sexism might be partially explained by endorse-
ment of more global belief constructs—values—received em-
pirical support, complementing and extending previous stud-
ies on religiosity and sexism.
While the negative effects of hostile sexism are undisputed,
there is less social acknowledgement of the negative conse-
quences of benevolent sexism. These effects are documented
in research, but remain obscured, to their perpetrators and
targets alike, by the fact of their indirect influence. Thus,
questions remain concerning the mechanisms of perpetuation
of benevolent sexism—and the mechanisms required for its
elimination. If churches and other trusted and powerful social
institutions are unwittingly fostering discrimination, as indi-
cated in our study, we can hardly expect imminent societal
change. The simple conclusion from our study is that one
indirect effect of promoting tradition, stability, and security
is the perpetuation of an unequal status quo. The complicated
follow-up: how do we respect our history and maintain social
harmony while changing the world?
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Appendix
Table 5 Polish wording for the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory items
English version Polish version
1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person
unless he has the love of a woman.
Bez względu na swoje osiągnięcia zawodowe, mężczyzna nie jest
całością bez miłości kobiety.
2. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that
favor them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality.”
Pod pretekstem równouprawnienia wiele kobiet zabiega o specjalne
przywileje, takie jak faworyzująca polityka zatrudnienia.
3. In a disaster, women ought to be rescued before men. W razie katastrofy najpierw należy ratować kobiety, potem
mężczyzn.
4. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist. Większość kobiet interpretuje niewinne uwagi lub zachowania jako
seksistowskie.
5. Women are too easily offended. Kobiety zbyt łatwo się obrażają.
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